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In this article I argue that the dialectic between cause and effect in the 
‘Doctrine of Essence’ of Hegel’s Science of Logic serves to dispel the ever-
persistent notion that the Hegelian system is a linear movement. While it is 
true that Hegel’s speculative philosophy is a systematic unfolding, it is an 
error to suppose that the Hegelian system operates as a smooth, progressive 
development, mechanically moving forward in a unidirectional manner. The 
treatment of causation in The Science of Logic is not a simple movement where 
one term encounters its antithesis and sublates itself. On the contrary, causality 
engenders a reciprocal action, and is what Hegel calls a double transition or a 
double movement (gedopplete Bewegung), where the cause determines the 
effect, and the effect determines the cause. In a crucial passage in the Science 
of Logic Hegel clarifies the significance of the double movement: “for a totality 
to be posited, a double transition is required, not only the transition of one 
determinateness into another but equally the transition of this other into the 
first, its going back into it,” he goes on to declare that “this remark regarding 
the necessity of the double transition is everywhere of great importance for 
scientific method.”1 Hegel’s Aufhebung, ‘sublation,’ is shown to be more intricate 
because it involves a twofold movement, a double transition, rather than a 
simple one to one transition. A popular criticism of the Hegelian system is its 
ceaseless linear progression, whereby each stage, each moment of Spirit’s 
unfolding is seen as a necessary moment, only to be sublated into the next 
moment. Just to take a canonical example, in his Concluding Unscientific 
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Postscript, Kierkegaard takes this view of Hegel’s systematic philosophy, 
proclaiming:
According to Hegel, truth is the continued world-historical process. 
Each generation, each stage of this process, is legitimated, yet is 
only an element in the truth. Short of settling for some charlatanry, 
which helps by assuming that Prof. Hegel’s own generation, or the 
one now succeeding him, is imprimatur [Latin: let it be printed], that 
the generation is the last and world history over, we are all implicated 
in scepticism. The passionate question of truth does not even arise 
because philosophy has first tricked the individuals into becoming 
objective. The positive Hegelian truth is as illusory as was happiness in 
paganism. Only afterwards does one get to know whether or not one 
has been happy; and similarly the next generation gets to know what 
truth was in the preceding generation. The great secret of the system 
(yet this remains unter uns [between us], just like the secret among 
the Hegelians) is close to Protagoras’s sophism ‘Everything is relative’, 
except that here everything is relative in the continued progression.2
  
While it may be tempting to simply dismiss Kierkegaard’s treatment of Hegel 
as nothing but an empty caricature, there is—to borrow a phrase from Marx—a 
kernel of truth hidden in its mystical shell. In the Preface to the Phenomenology 
of Spirit, Hegel declares: “the True is the whole.”3  Hegel’s systematic philosophy 
has been the subject of continuous reproach and criticism, specifically for its 
claim to completeness whereby each and every logical moment is but one 
in a series of moments leading up to the Absolute. Each moment in Hegelian 
philosophy is, allegedly, legitimised; that is to say, it is a necessary part of 
the greater whole. This has led to the popular conception of Hegel as the 
thinker of necessity par excellence. This is true insofar as Hegel’s philosophical 
system develops by way an internal, immanent deductive logic. However, 
Kierkegaard’s remark that within the Hegelian system everything relative is 
also in a continuous progression exemplifies the general resentment towards 
Hegel’s absolute idealism. Hegel is treated primarily as a thinker of necessity. 
But is Hegel strictly a thinker of necessity, or of freedom? Is he a thinker of 
radical emancipation or mechanical determinism? Slavoj Žižek comments on this 
aspect:
The Hegelian relationship between necessity and freedom is usually 
read in terms of their ultimate coincidence: true freedom has nothing 
to do with capricious free choice; it means the priority of self-relating 
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to relating-to-other; in other words, an entity is free when it can 
deploy its immanent potential without being impeded by an external 
obstacle. From here, it is easy to develop the standard argument 
against Hegel: his system is a fully ‘saturated’ set of categories, with 
no place for contingency and indeterminacy, for Hegel’s logic, each 
category follows with an inexorable immanent-logical necessity from 
the preceding one, with the entire series of categories forming a self-
enclosed Whole. We can see now what this argument misses: the 
Hegelian dialectical process is not this ‘saturated’, self-contained, 
necessary Whole, but an open and contingent process through which 
such a Whole forms itself. In other words, the reproach confuses 
being with becoming: it perceives a fixed order of Being (the network 
of categories) what is for Hegel is the process of Becoming which, 
retroactively, engenders its necessity.4 
Indeed, the Hegelian system is a radically open, contingent movement whereby 
the absolute unified Whole forms itself. Žižek is right to insist that the usual 
criticisms of Hegel’s system as a closed totality miss the point, as it were. 
However, this sort of characterisation of Hegel’s philosophy still continues 
and is all-too common. Frank Ruda has also recently summed up this general 
negative reproach to Hegel: “Hegel was too much of a rationalist and thereby 
too much of an irrationalist. He was too dialectical, that is, too systematic. 
He sought obsessively to integrate everything into an encyclopaedic totality, 
and his method swallowed up everything. His megalomania shows itself in his 
attempt to consume, by the very means of exclusion, all the things that he 
excludes.”5 Indeed, the image of the Hegelian’s system as an all-encompassing 
monster that consumes everything and arranges it into a logically necessary 
progression is still ever pervasive despite being something of a chimera. It is a 
caricature that turns Hegel into the absolute thinker of necessity. While it is true 
that Hegel’s philosophy develops and unfolds through an immanent dialectical 
logic, it is inaccurate to suppose that such a development is a linear, smooth 
chronological movement. The various dialectical transitions in Hegel’s system 
are far from simple one-to-one movements. Žižek is correct to emphasize the 
radical openness and contingency of Hegel’s project. Yes, things do progress in 
the Hegelian system but the path of progression is forever marked by negativity, 
rupture, chaos, and therefore it is “the way of despair.”6 
 While totality is rightly associated with Hegel’s philosophy, what tends 
to be overlooked in this characterisation is the intricate dynamism with which 
the singular terms and categories of his system relate to one another, how 
they coalesce and inhere, without entirely annulling themselves. Indeed, such 
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intricate movement is the work of Aufhebung in Hegel’s philosophy. When 
terms are shown to be in dialectical contradiction, their resolution occurs by 
way of Aufhebung, with an almost surgical precision. Hegel’s double transition 
accounts for the inherence of the singular terms most explicitly in his treatment 
of causality at the end of the ‘Doctrine of Essence.’ Hegel’s double movement 
occurs in all of the sublated transitions in The Science of Logic. Therefore, I will 
limit my discussion to two examples: the implicit and the explicit. Accordingly, 
what follows is divided into two sections. In the first section I provide a brief 
exposition on the logic of the double movement implicit in the dialectic from 
being to nothingness. In the second section, I reconstruct Hegel’s argument for 
reciprocal causality and show how the double transition is the explicit in this 
dialectic. 
I. The Implicit Logic of the Double Movement
In her now rightly influential book The Future of Hegel, Catherine Malabou makes 
the following observation with regards to the Hegelian notion Aufhebung: “In its 
movement, the dialectical sublation is not a frozen process whose modalities are 
fixed once and for all, remaining detached and separate from everything it sets 
in motion.”7  Malabou’s point here is that sublation is not an empty formalistic 
process devoid of all content; it is not an external operation whereby it can 
be haphazardly applied to any and all external objects. For Hegel, the form 
cannot be separated from its content, and the work of sublation is no exception. 
Sublation is composed of  “two factors conditioned by negativity, these being 
the two modalities of suppression and preservation…both together forming the 
energy of the negative.”8  It is precisely this energy of the negative that gives 
Hegel’s negation of negation its power and force. Sublation determines what 
it sublates. When something is absolutely negated, it isn’t entirely cancelled 
out, there is a minimal remainder and it is this preservation that transforms the 
sublated term into something decidedly new. It’s important to note here that 
the dual aspect of Aufhebung to which Malabou refers is not what Hegel means 
by the double transition, or the double movement. The double movement is 
what leads towards right before the two moments are sublated. The logic of the 
double movement is necessary for sublation. It is for this reason that we need 
to see how Hegel establishes the logic of the double movement before we can 
understand its relation to Aufhebung.
 The double movement finds its purest expression in Hegel’s Science 
of Logic. The general structure of Hegel’s Science of Logic is something 
of puzzlement. Divided into three separate books: Being, Essence, and 
the Concept, Hegel’s ontological masterwork deals with abstract thought-
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determinations. It is helpful, I wager, for us to think of the tripartite structure 
of the texts as revolving around the theme of determinacy, determinateness 
(Bestimmtheit) and determination (Bestimmung). Insofar as Hegel’s Aufhebung 
is a process where by thought-determinations are brought about, it is crucial 
for us to grasp the meaning of this notorious word. To properly do this, we first 
need to understand what Hegel means by determinacy. Not only is determinacy 
one of the many over-arching themes of the Logic, but also in order for us 
to properly think and grasp Hegel’s Aufhebung and the logic of the double 
movement. Thus, some clarification is in order. 
 Within Hegelian terminology, then, determinacy or determinateness 
denotes that which distinguishes a thing or a concept from any other thing or 
concept. Something can be said to be determinate in being what it is in itself, 
rather than being what it is in relation to, or by mediation from something else. 
Determination, has two senses: i) delimitation, definition, making something 
or a concept more determinate by adding features to it; and ii) destination, 
destiny, calling or vocation. Determination is a thing or concept’s intrinsic nature 
insofar as it manifests itself in the thing’s relation to others. For example, the 
ability to think can be said to be the determination of humanity because it is 
the defining character of our species in relation to others (e.g., animals, things, 
etc.). If something fulfils its determination (i.e., its destiny or calling), then it also 
fulfils its concept (Begriff). In Hegelian philosophy, the destiny or determination 
of the concept is to determine, or fulfil itself. In this sense, then, we can see 
here how the concept exhibits self-determination (Selbstbestimmung). Self-
determination is the self-development, or self-movement of something. 
Something is self-determined if and only if it does not receive its determination 
by an external force or term. Logically, something can be said to be free if and 
only if it is self-determining.9 The first book of Hegel’s Logic, ‘The Doctrine 
of Being’, can be seen as the development of determinacy/determinateness 
as such. While what concerns the second book, ‘The Doctrine of Essence’, is 
the immanent development of the relations between the determiner and that 
which it determines. This relation is spoken of in terms of positedness in order 
to articulate the interconnected relationship between that which determines 
and that which is determined. For Hegel, to say that something is posited 
(gesetzt) can either mean: i) that it is explicitly set out, rather than implicit, 
or for itself. For example, what is merely implicit in a seed, is posited (made 
explicit) in the plant; or ii) that which is posited is dependant on, or produced 
by, something else. If something is posited, then, in Hegelian terminology, it has 
positedness. What posits and what gets posited can also be spoken of in the 
language of determinateness.  When something gets its determinateness from 
something else, then it is posited by that other something. Richard Dien Winfield 
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summarizes this point succinctly: 
In order for determinacy to be posited rather than coevally given, 
determinacy must become mediated by something that underlies it as 
its determiner. This mediation minimally removes the immediacy with 
which quality, quantity, and measure comprise contrastive relations of 
terms having no primacy with respect to one another. The content of 
these terms is not thereby annulled or modified. Rather, that content is 
simply rendered mediated by a determiner, giving it the form of a posit 
posited by some positor.10
Thus, we can say that positedness is determined determinacy, rather than a 
determinacy that is not determined by some external factor and simply assumed 
to be a given. The two-tiered dynamic of determiner and the determined, or of 
the positor and the posited, is the general theme of ‘The Doctrine of Essence,’ 
and it is exactly what Hegel’s double movement, or double transition addresses 
in the section on causation. In the aforementioned example of the seed and the 
plant, what posits and what gets posited conveys an immanent movement, an 
immanent relation. Entailed implicitly within the seed is the genetic information 
that gets posited, or made manifest, as the plant grows.11  Finally, in the third and 
final book of the Logic, ‘The Doctrine of the Concept,’ the relation and language 
of positing and posited is abandoned, this is because the concept is what posits 
and determines itself, rather than being dependant on an other term or category 
for its positedness.
 Aufhebung first comes on the scene in the opening dialectic of ‘The 
Doctrine of Being.’ Pure, abstract thought generates its own indeterminate, 
immediate content as a genuine, presuppositionless beginning for speculative 
science. For Hegel, such a beginning is the category of pure being, without 
any further determinations. Pure being is pure precisely because it lacks any 
qualification and quantification. There is absolutely no determinacy present. 
We cannot say anything about pure being, except, of course, that it is pure. As 
Hegel himself says of pure being, “in its indeterminate immediacy it is equal only 
to itself and also not unequal with respect to another; it has no difference within 
it, nor any outwardly.”12 Pure being is shown to be nothingness due to the utter 
lack of determinations. With no qualifications or quantifications, the category 
of sheer being moves into the category of nothing. It is crucial to stress that 
Hegel is not drawing a relation of identity between being and nothing. To clam 
that being and nothing are identical presupposes the law of identity, that is, it 
presupposes an external criteria that thought can bring to judge the content 
it thinks. In other words, it presupposes too much at the outset. Insofar as we 
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are dealing with simple, indeterminate and immediate categories, thought 
moves from being to nothing. With being, thought passed over to nothing; and 
with nothing it once again passed over to being. This work of ‘passed over’ 
is the process of becoming, of thought’s activity. But what is becoming? For 
Hegel there are two moments of becoming: coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be. 
The move from pure being to nothing is thought of as ‘ceasing-to-be’, while 
the move from nothing to being is ‘coming-to-be’. What has occurred here is 
the sublation of being and nothingness. That is to say, in this rightly famous 
opening of the Science of Logic, Hegel shows us how both being and nothing 
are preserved and annulled by the work of sublation. They are sublated into 
a new category of thought: becoming. Becoming is composed of both being 
and nothing insofar as it is simultaneously a coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be 
of anything whatsoever. The cycle between being and nothing, nothing and 
being, dissolves into a single unity. However, this dissolution into a unity is not 
an abstracted unity. As Hegel makes clear “becoming is the unseparatedness of 
being and nothing, not the unity that abstracts from being and nothing.”13 Both 
being and nothing are integral moments of becoming. However, insofar as they 
are two moments of becoming, being and nothing only subsist in becoming as 
sublated moments. Being ceases-to-be and becomes nothing; nothing comes-
to-be and becomes being. For Hegel: “they sink from their initially represented 
self-subsistence into moment which are still distinguished but as the same 
time sublated.”14 It is at this conjuncture where Hegel introduces the double 
movement in Aufhebung, albeit implicitly. Let’s follow Hegel in his own words 
here:
Grasped as thus distinguished each is in their distinguishedness a 
unity with the other. Becoming thus contains being and nothing as 
two such unities, each of which is itself until of being and nothing; 
one is being as immediate and as reference to nothing; the other is 
nothing as immediate and as reference to being; in these unities the 
determinations are of unequal value.
 Becoming is in this way doubly determined.  In one determination, 
nothing is the immediate, that is, the determination begins with 
nothing and this refers to being; that is to say, it passes over into 
it. In the other determination, being is the immediate, that is, the 
determination begins with being and this passes over into nothing —
coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be.15
   
This passage, while abstract, contains the Hegelian double movement. As the 
truth of being and nothing, becoming contains the two as its moments. The 
movement is double because there are two determinations at work here. The 
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first is from being to nothing (i.e., ceasing-to-be); the second is from nothing 
to being (i.e., coming-to-be). It is slightly misleading to speak of these two 
determinations as ‘perspectives,’ or ‘directions,’ however. The term ‘perspective’ 
presupposes perception, and perception presupposes a phenomenal object 
which appears and demands to be perceived from a particular vantage point. 
Furthermore, the term ‘direction’ is also misleading because it presupposes 
time, and time, in turn, presupposes quantifications and all sorts of spatio-
temporal relations that Hegel is not even concerned with at the start of the 
Logic. No, it is crucial that Hegel here calls the double movement a double 
determination. Recall that a determination in Hegelian philosophy is a thing or 
category’s intrinsic nature insofar as it manifests itself in the thing’s relation to 
others. Thus, what the double movement/determination illustrates is that being 
is only what it is in relation to its opposite, nothing, and conversely nothing is 
only what it is, in reference to its opposite. Each determines itself in reference 
to its other by passing over into its other. Insofar as both terms becomes their 
respect other, they both constitute becoming. This double determination in the 
double movement is implicit in becoming itself — becoming contains the two 
moments of being and nothing and their reciprocal ceasing-to-be and coming-
to-be. It is paramount to emphasise that it is this double movement that leads 
to Aufbehung. As John W. Burbidge puts it, it is: “the reciprocal move from one 
thought to its opposite and back again that leads to sublation.”16 As we see here, 
Hegel opens the ‘Doctrine of Being’ with a dialectic that implicitly demonstrated 
the double movement. It is in Hegel’s treatment of causality, however, where this 
double movement becomes explicit.
II. The Explicit Logic of the Double Movement
Hegel’s account causality is fully developed in the closing chapter of ‘The 
Doctrine of Essence,’ in the discussion of reciprocity in the section on ‘Actuality’. 
Structurally, we have moved from ‘The Doctrine of Being’ to that of Essence. 
To say the same thing in more thematic terms: we have moved from bare 
determinacy in the logic of being, to determined determinacy in the logic of 
essence. This shift from being to essential being and its many varied relations 
is crucial. For Hegel, the truth of the category of being is the category of 
essence. Essence’s own being consists in positing its own being, as mediated 
and no longer self-subsistent. Hegel’s account of essential determination 
involves reflection because essence reflects in the very determinacies it 
posits: this is why the general structural theme of ‘The Doctrine of Essence’ is 
determined determinacy.17 It is within the treatment of essence that Hegel’s 
double transition becomes explicit. It’s externalisation manifests in Hegel’s 
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discussion of reciprocity of action, or causality. To summarise very briefly, a 
cause is only a cause in relation to its effect, and an effect is only an effect by 
virtue of its relation to a cause. There is a reciprocal relation between the two 
terms, whereby each presupposes the other, or to put it differently, each is, 
simultaneously, both cause and effect. Each term in the casual relation plays 
a double role: as cause and as effect. If a cause is only a cause by virtue of its 
effect, then the effect can be said to be constitutive of the cause, the effect 
causes the cause to be a cause. Without the effect, we cannot legitimately 
determine the cause to be a cause, and for this reason the cause is just as much 
a cause as it is an effect. This is the logic of the double movement, and this 
logic also applies to the category of effect. An effect can only be what it is in 
relation to its cause, its antecedent, yet this relation also entails it (the effect) to 
determine the cause to be what it is. 
 For Hegel, this double movement, embedded within both the logical 
categories of cause and effect, constitutes what he calls the ‘reciprocity of 
action.’18 For example, if A is the cause of B, then the effect B can logically be 
said to be entailed in the cause A. Conversely, entailed in the effect B is the 
cause A. A, as cause, posits its effect B, and B, as effect, is posited by A. Each 
term is at the same time an effect and a cause, each side presupposes the 
other but in this presupposition of the other it presupposes itself, and both are 
continuously acting and reacting in this reciprocal relation. Each side of the 
causal relation contains the other in itself, that is, each side implies the other (a 
cause implies an effect, and an effect implies a cause). However, if the cause 
contains its effect within it, and the effect contains the cause, then the difference 
between the two is cancelled, and the difference subsequently vanishes. What 
remains is simply one single cause, or as Hegel states, “reciprocity of action 
is, therefore, only causality itself; the cause does not just have an effect but, 
in the effect refers as cause back to itself.”19 The distinction between a cause 
and its effect is sublated, or overcome, and causality is no longer categorically 
a relation between two distinct terms, or two relata, but rather what emerges 
from this dialectic is a metamorphosis to a category of causality that causes 
itself, that is self-causing. 
 The alleged distinction between cause and effect is dissolved, and 
what endures in, and emerges from, this dissolution is the Concept. Hegel 
demonstrates that the category of formal causality, when logically thought 
through its own determinate terms of cause and effect, (i.e., inner necessity) 
evolves and transitions into a new term that is self-causing, self-relating, and by 
consequence also self-determining, rather than merely obeying the two-tiered 
dynamic of determiner and determined. For Hegel, that which is self-causing, 
and self-determining, is the concept, and freedom falls within its realm precisely 
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because it is the logic of the concept that deals with self-determination.20 
For something to be self-determined implies that it develops autonomously 
without any recourse or reference to other external terms or factors. For x to 
be considered self-determining, it cannot rely upon an external term, such as 
y, for its determinateness. If it did rely on y for its determination, then x would 
be something posited by y. A self-determining entity cannot be continent 
upon, or determined by, any other term other than itself to be what it is. In this 
sense, logically speaking, what is self-determined is also free because it only 
relies upon its own self to cohere and self-subsist. Recall that in the German, 
determination (Bestimmung) also denotes a sense of calling, or destiny. If 
something fulfils its determination (its destination), then, it also fulfils its 
concept. In this sense, we can see why Hegel maintains that the concept alone 
is self-determining, because if something fulfils its determination by fulfilling its 
concept, then the concept is that which fulfils itself. The concept arrives at its 
destination only through itself. As Burbidge rightly observes, 
Careful reflection on the relation of cause and effect, however, reveals 
that something can be a cause only if it is in some way incited to 
action by some other substance upon which it in due course works 
its effects. There is, then, a reciprocal interaction between two 
‘substances.’ So we come to the thought of a double transition, from 
the one substance over to another that it incites to action, and from 
that other, now made casually effective, back to the original one.21  
  
The opposition and distinction between cause and effect, between determiner 
and the determined, is removed in Hegel’s account reciprocal action. Both 
have been shown to determine the other. This co-determination is, of course, 
the logical expression of the double movement made explicit. The mutual 
action involved here is not a unidirectional and linear progression. Thus, what 
the many critics of Hegel’s philosophy fail to grasp is the intricate logic of 
the double movement, both in its implicit and explicit aspects. If the Hegelian 
system were simply a unidirectional, linear progression propelled by necessary 
determinations and relations, then there would be no room for the double 
movement. Of course, it is true that the double movement itself must collapse 
once both of its moments have been sublated, but the work of sublation is far 
from a rigid, one-to-one operation devoid of any content. To reproach Hegel’s 
system for necessarily determining all its contents is to act as if the there is no 
reciprocal, mutual determination at work in any cause to its effect. In short, it’s 
to treat the Hegelian system as — for a lack of a better term — unidirectional 
rather than bi-directional.
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